Link Between Islamophobia And Racism Cultural Studies Essay

Link surrounded by Islamophobia And Racism Cultural Studies EssayIndeed, such(prenominal)(prenominal) literature is dedicated to oral sex the (mis)appropriateness of Islamophobia as a labeller of phobia generated, presumptively, from an change magnitudely visible presence of Islam / Muslims in the U.K. in recent years. 1,2,3 The case for / against Islamophobia, depending on which party holds argument, is, in fact, do blurry given over the ambiguity of what constitutes a Muslim identity in the first place. 4 Con perspectivering potenti every(prenominal)y multiple identities of U.K. Muslims 5,6, contestation between and inwardly concerned parties holds a fluid ground more so base on or as a result of liquid of what makes up Islamophobia. This paper examines multilayered manipulations of Islamophobia as contested inwardly a U.K context. The argument, first, discusses literature on execute transaction and immigration policies, more emphasis cosmos lay on policies pertaini ng to Commonwealth subjects in Indian Subcontinent. An examination follows of how passage- base (addressing ethnicality, assimilation and multiculturalism issues) as opposed to cartel-based (addressing religious practices, rights, and interfaith dealings) protections slang such(prenominal) influenced and/or multiform up contestations over Islam, Muslims and, most importantly, Islamophobia, if any, within a U.K. context. Fin altogethery, Islamophobia is placed in a wider atomic number 63an context in which contestation over Islamophobia as such is connected to Continental debates on modern nation-states and multiculturalisms.Race, step on it dealing and immigration policiesHistorically, Britain has received waves of immigrants of different blood for a multitude of reasons. Yet, post-World contend II period, peculiarly during mid-1940s, mid-fifties and 1960s, witnessed unprecedented inflow into major industrial cities for reconstruction efforts. 7,8 Up until late 1960s, no specific laws addressed inter-ethnic effect and conflict. Ironically, ex-colonies subjects were regarded, after all, as second class citizens. 9 Only when families of Asian (primarily Pakistani, Indian and Bangladeshi) works started to flood English cities and ports in what is referred to as chemical chain immigration (i.e. residents invite close family members and friends and, once settled, relatives and friends invite their own families and friends) did topical anesthetic acts of ethnic violence give prominence to and raise public cognisance on a national level of alien citizen status as part of British reality. 10Still, post-World War II period is nonp aril characterised more by inflammatory statements do ab tabu nationals of non-British blood and descent 11 rather than ab tabu citizens whose allegiance to British values and way of life is questionable beca purpose of a disparate creed such as in case of southbound-Asians. Indicative of an increasingly racialised publ ic give-and-take pertaining to immigrants and naturalise subjects isWhen individuals like the Marquis of Salisbury spoke of swearing the English way of life, they were non simply referring to economic or regional folk patterns, that explicitly to the preservation of the racial character of the English people. We have developing hither a process of subjectification grounded in a racialised construction of the British line of business which excludes and includes people on the basis of race/skin colour. 12Indeed, race remains a fundamental subtext of British hegemonic discourse during colonial era, in post-World War II period and beyond. For wiz, one staple justification for oppressiveness of nations, groups and individuals is race. 13 Further, in case of a South Asian minority, presumably British Subjects, race is invoked as a justification for inequalities at workplace, housing, education, let alone political rights. 14In essence, race and racism essentialise subjects of ra cist acts. Similar to all hegemonic practices which follow specific origin relations within an overarching power structure, racism emphasises superior vs. Inferior duality in revisal not tho when to maintain existing power relations nevertheless also to morally justify excesses of inequalities. 15In British context, South Asian workers predominantly from Pakistan, India and Bangladesh particularly during first mass immigration waves of 1940s, 1950s and 1960s were, like a gear fit into a large wheel, brought in as props, imported, used, and returned. Initially, South Asians workers performed and acted as underdogs much to masters delight. Later, however, as familiarity of British System and Administration developed amongst workers of non-British blood, riots and protests became noise (racist) masters necessary to work on. Thus, successive legislations regulating immigrants status within U.K. borders were, appargonntly, meant to control influx of immigrants and to align Bri tish Subjects along rise-defined ethnic boundaries.16 As U.K.s ethnic makeup diversified over time and across localities, states insistence on ethnic markers between and within ethnic groups grew by leaps and bounds.The racism formula, endorsed by laws and working brilliantly in a colonial era and reasonably so within borders during early days of mass immigration, turned out problematic if not unstabilising given growing pressures of growing minorities in sackful cities, minorities now capable of tipping vote balance.Ultimately, a multi-ethnic / multicultural ships company is not based on a ingenuouswill, all-accommodating multiculturalism discourse one meant to take on ethnic / racial / cultural differences per se by way of minority rights but, rather, one emphasizing ethnic markers for further state control. 17 In fact, state control, in so farthermost as British Muslims are concerned, represents a clear instance not only of an ethnicity manipulated (at multiple layers of discourse in government, media, and education) but, further still, of an identity (i.e. BrMislim / BrAsian) manipulated (at just same layers) and hence fluidity of what constitutes Islam / Muslim and, probably in turn, Islamophobia. Understanding an emerging Islamophobia requires, however, an examination of developing of race relations politics from one based on race to one based on faith.Race, faith, Islamophobia, and multiculturalismBy definition, political discourse is one characterised by manipulation and is, largely, subject to voters sway in democracies. 18 policy-making Correctness (PC) is just one example of political machination. In essence, a politically crystalize expression is a euphemism meant (and, for that matter, meaning) less to fulfil satisfaction conditions required for an unjust statement and more as instrumental. Thus, British policies on race and ethnicity has marked a shift since installation of race relations acts of 1965 and 1968 19 from an emphasis on racial contrast to an emphasis on religious extremism and bigotry as a basis for incrimination only selectively, excluding BrMuslims.Indeed, incitement to plague based on affiliation to Islam is one major legal anomaly scholars continue to point out to. 19, 20 Interestedly, given papers purposes, racial discrimination against BrAsians has not, in fact, been eliminated by virtue of climb on in legislation on racial relations but only diverted to another(prenominal) (unprotected by law) dimension, signifi fuelt as is, of a BrAsian subjects identity. That is, being Muslim.That multilayered public discourse has, moreover, shifted from race to faith is indicative not of actionable (as opposed to pronounced) change but of power structure(s) embedded in race relations discourses in the U.K. Thus, in place of a racialised discourse based on BrAsian intrusion into Britishness, same racial group, now British Muslims, comes out as anti-British. Typical of a manipulative political discou rse a game of labelling and re-labelling underprivileged, underrepresented groups (except in prisons) is enacted such that power relations as engineered, largely but not always by, state are retained within and between different ethnicities in a multicultural community which is, Britain. Unsurprisingly, a set of composite metrics has been developed in order to note Britishness. 21 That such metrics combine gauges of loyalties at intra-national (i.e. Britain), national (i.e. England, Scotland, etc), or local (e.g. Bradford) levels is, indeed, indicative of an ethnic identity crisis, particularly so in case of BrAsians / BrMuslims. As a consequence, a group diverse as BrAsians / BrMuslims and framed as inassimilable 22 into wider and mainstream community is bundled up altogether, tagged and make alien. Islamophobia is, one argues, an expression of an anxiety over ethnicity identity.Indeed, Islamophobic sentiments are, upon close examination, aimed not at Islam per se but at Muslims . 23 In fact, literature repeatedly points out that people, rather than faith, is phobes trajectory. 23, 24,25 A broad overview of British media is indicative of who is meant and labelledIf you doubt whether Islamophobia exists in Britain, I Gordon Conway, Head of Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia suggest you spend a week reading, as I have done, a range of national and local papers. If you look for articles which refer to Muslims or to Islam you will find prejudiced and antagonistic comments, mostly subtle but somewhattimes blatant and crude. Where the media lead, many will follow. British Muslims suffer discrimination in their education and in the workplace. Acts of harassment and violence against Muslims are common. 26Thus, Islamophobia, a label gaining currency in media and academia thanks to Runnymede Trusts much publicised report Islamophobia, a dispute for us all 27 has acquired such a canonical status as to render substitute neologisms unrepresentative of r esponses to Islam / Muslims. According to Halliday,Islamophobia indulges conformism and authority within Muslim communities. unity cannot avoid the sense, in regard to work such as the Runnymede floor that the race relations world has yielded, for reasons of political emphasis added convenience, on this term. 28Moreover,The use of Islamophobia also challenges the possibility of dialogue based on universal principles. It suggeststhat the event lies in greater dialogue, bridge-building and respect for the other community, but this inevitably runs the assay of denying the right, or possibility, of criticisms of the practices of those with whom one is having the dialogue. Not only those who, on universal piece rights grounds, object to elements in Islamic traditions and current rhetoric, but also those who challenge conservative readings from within, can more easily be classed as Islamophobes. 29Thus, Islamophobia is employed in such a politically correct modality such as to silen ce criticisms, on one hand, and to maintain good neighbourhood relations, on another. The former stance is framed, in right-leaning perspective, as militant, jihadist, terrorist, uncivil, anti-modern and anti-Western. 30 The latter is framed, in Islamist perspective, as accommodating, assimilative and hegemonic. In between is media, an knowledge base for meaning-making and shifting perceptions.Alternatively, Islamophobia can be employed not as a politically correct euphemism in order to silence internal criticisms or to maintain law and order but, rather, to militate against an other. This could take a rule of dismantling politeness courtesies essential not for a politically correct dialogue but for one based on critical questioning. Still, Islamophobia could be further employed such as a cover up for supposedly hidden hegemonic agendas. 31One peculiar shift for Islamophobia as contested within a U.K. context is how instead of imported aliens made citizens being instigators of ha te, violence, unrest, and, ultimately terror an enemy within image is constructed and maintained such as to, apparently, pass Islamophobic sentiments, if any, from one generation onto another. 32 For some now increasingly most, credit to media rivers of actual blood running capital of the United Kingdom streets following London 7/7 ( la 9/11 codification) attacks are reminiscent of symbolic blood as invoked by Enoch Powell in his Birmingham speech in 1968As I look ahead, I am filled with foreboding. Like the Roman, I seem to see the River Tiber foaming with much blood. The tragic and intractable phenomenon i.e. immigration which we emphasis added watch with horror on the other side of the Atlantic, but which there is interwoven with the history and existence of the States itself, is coming upon us here by our own volition and our own neglect. 33Unsurprisingly, Powells afraid(predicate) pronouncements just as all xenophobic pronouncements -gain further inertia as an apparently s elf-fulfilling prophecy comes true. Admittedly, most, if not all, far-right politics tap into a well-rehearsed repertoire of phobias not least Islamophobia. Moreover, whole political careers are created and deepen based on precautions from an other now of colour, now of race, and now of different faith. Across Europe, ballot boxes speak volumes of Islamophobia tapped into as a final stamping ground against an imminent green menace within. 34,35Islamophobia European contextPlaced in a wider context, Islamophobia is not exclusive to U.K. As a matter of fact, for Europe in which U.K. is situated and to which it is historically affiliated Islamophobia is a common currency. Indeed, to each one European country has a distinctive narrative to tell of Islam / Muslims. Yet, for all differences, European nations especially former colonial powers share common narratives of home-grown terrorists and phobias. 36 Interestingly still is how European nation states follow a homogeneous patt ern of state controls over flow of (now particularly Muslim) immigrants as well as controls of modes of conducts of minorities within. 37In fact, U.K.s, and for that matter Europes, current immigration laws and policies cannot be fully understood in isolation of European conception of nation-states.Historically, European nation-states evolved into democratic polities in which upholding order and rule of law required uniform policies. 38 As European countries grew increasingly into political, economic and scientific powerhouses, an increasing influx of immigrants required subtler means of control. Typically, in major European countries such as U.K. enacting multiculturalism policies meant, at least apparently in so far as actual practices are concerned, less room for truly diverse communities and more for accommodation, assimilation, and full integration of an increasing alien presence posing, allegedly, menaces to ceremonious European Enlightenment canonical values of reason and s ecularism. 39 belike understandably, far-right currents in European politics manipulated political machinery inciting violence and hatred at times creating, only in voters minds, all sorts of phobias.The case for Islamophobia is one, consequently, which can be understood primarily based on power relations established and maintained in a wider power structure of Europe. This is particularly significant if one is to grasp global (i.e. Western) war on Islam, which is not. For all long-established and nourished power structures need a signifier, a marker, which, presumably , contains, defines, and tags an expect other only to maintain law and order in an endless historical power struggle over hearts and minds.In conclusion, Islamophobia is, ultimately, a (mis)label slapped onto bottled up power relations within a marked power structure. In U.K. context, Islamophobia is used, as has been demonstrated, not to mark a shift in discursive practices towards a truly multicultural communit y but to maintain embedded power relations in which specific groups are charge definite space within ethnic markers. Initially, race is used to maintain power structures but upon introduction of race acts and laws, subtler formers of control and manipulation are employed by which focus is shift from race per se to faith not as a creed but as another boundary of control.